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Abstract 
Visual neuroscience is concerned with the neurobiological foundations of visual 
perception, i.e. the morphological, physiological and functional organisation of the 
visual brain and its co-operative partners. One important approach for understanding the 
functional organisation of the visual brain is the study of visual perception from the 
pathological perspective. The study of patients with focal injury to the visual brain 
allows conclusions about the representation of visual perceptual functions in the 
framework of association and dissociation of functions. Selective disorders have been 
reported for more “elementary” visual capabilities, for example, colour and movement 
vision, but also for visuo-cognitive capacities, for example visual agnosia or the visual 
field of attention. Because these visual disorders occur rather seldom as selective and 
specific dysfunctions, single cases have always played, and still play, a significant role 
in gaining insights into the functional organisation of the visual brain. 
 
Neuroanatomical and behavioural evidence in dogs and primates had already 
suggested that the posterior brain is indispensable for vision, including higher visual 
capacities, such as visual recognition (for a review, see Polyak, 1957). In 1887, 
Wilbrand had summarized the available empirical clinical evidence. He argued for 
functional specialization in the visual brain, albeit within the different cortical layers of 
the same area, i.e. the light, colour and form “senses” being tied to “relatively separate 
cell clusters in the centre of optic perception” (p. 73; author’s translation). However, 
notwithstanding evidence from clinical reports of selective disorders in, for example, 
colour vision (Verrey 1888), the concept of functional specialization in the visual brain 
was rejected, not only by Henschen and Holmes, but by influential figures such as von 
Monakow (1914), and later by Holmes (1945) and Teuber et al. (1960; for a 
comprehensive review and discussion, see Zeki, 1993). 
Cases showing a visual loss of, for example, colour (achromatopsia), motion 
(akinetopsia), depth (astereopsis), or stimulus recognition (visual agnosia) are rare and 
seldom occur in a selective form. The evidence they provide is necessarily gleaned from 
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the study of single cases. The scepticism about visual functional localization arose, not 
only from entrenched views about whether the ‘visual receptive centre’ is confined to 
striate cortex, but also from the paucity of cases demonstrating, unequivocally, a 
selective deficit as a consequence of a more or less strictly localizable injury to the 
visual brain. Alfred Walter Campbell (1868-1937), the prominent Australian 
neuroanatomist, neuropathologist and later a clinical neurologist, has succinctly 
explained the reason for this: “It is almost impossible for nature to restrict a damaging 
lesion to the cortex, and to the cortex only, in question” (1905, p. 145). Thus, 
association of visual disorders after acquired brain injury is the rule, and dissociation 
the exception. 
The discovery in the late 1960s and early 1970s of a patchwork of visual cortical 
areas beyond striate cortex, in New and Old World monkeys, argued persuasively for 
specialized visual functions. Alongside this, detailed examination of single neurological 
cases began to extend these findings to the human brain.  The complete loss of a visual 
function following brain damage constitutes strong evidence for functional localization, 
suggesting a spatial segregation of different functions in different cortical regions. In 
contrast, the partial degradation of a function might suggest an alternative model 
whereby different visual functions are represented by, for example, different 
populations in an assembly of neurons. Evidence for and against these alternative 
accounts of visual brain organization may be derived from association and dissociation 
of visual functions. This approach was taken by Pöppel et al. (1978) in a comprehensive 
single case study. Their patient had suffered bilateral occipital infarction and, as a 
consequence, showed severe bilateral visual field restriction. Within the spared visual 
field, which also included the macular region, the patient showed a selective impairment 
3 
 
of colour vision and loss of stereopsis and face recognition, while object, letter and 
(short) word recognition were at least partly preserved, although very slowed. The 
authors interpreted their results in the framework of, first, a segregation of different 
visual functions (Zeki, 1974a) and, second, by representation of different visual 
functions within the same neuronal network. The former would explain the selective 
visual impairment, the latter would explain the “unspecific” loss of visual capacities, 
resulting from the effect of “mass action” (Lashley, 1931) causing a marked slowing of 
visual processing and responding. The case study by Pöppel et al. (1978) not only 
exemplifies a successful methodological approach to the question of dissociation and 
association of visual function, but also demonstrates the difficulty of interpreting a 
pattern of association and dissociation of visual functions within a single model of 
functional organization. 
In this mini-review, we present a number of single case studies, regarded as 
classic cases, because they have provided essential insights into the functional 
organization of the visual brain and added significant knowledge to the neuroscience of 
visual perception. We will focus on two visual-perceptual disorders (achromatopsia and 
akinetopsia), and two visual-cognitive disorders (visual agnosia and bilateral loss of the 
field of attention). 
The case of cerebral achromatopsia 
A salient attribute of our visual experience is colour, and the search for its neural basis 
has played a pivotal role in gaining insights into the functional organization of the 
visual brain. While Henschen, Von Monakow and others were charting the extent of the 
‘visuo-sensory cortex’, a Swiss ophthalmologist reported a striking case. Verrey (1888) 
described a 60-year-old woman, Madame R, who, following a stroke, was unable to see 
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colours in her right hemifield, a condition we now know as hemiachromatopsia. Post-
mortem examination revealed lesions in the fusiform and lingual gyri, beyond the 
‘cortical retina’ of Henschen. The, for some, unpalatable suggestion that a separate 
cortical region subserved colour was at odds with the unity of visual experience and 
countered the claim that the visual receptive area received all ‘visual impressions’, 
including colour, form and motion. It provoked a fierce debate (reviewed by Zeki, 1990) 
which was finally resolved when advances in physiology, neuroanatomy and 
neuroimaging revealed multiple visual areas in extrastriate cortex of monkey and man. 
The proposal that one of them, cortical area V4 in the monkey, contains a relatively 
high proportion of cells that code colour (Zeki, 1973) lent credence to the notion of a 
‘colour centre’ beyond striate cortex. Shortly thereafter, an influential review appeared 
(Meadows 1974) describing fourteen cases of cerebral achromatopsia with damage to 
the medial occipito-temporal cortex. In agreement with Verrey (1888), in each case of 
cortical colour blindness the lesion included the lingual or fusiform gyrus or both. The 
advent of neuroimaging confirmed a region of activation in the same vicinity when 
observers passively viewed chromatic, compared with achromatic, displays (Zeki et al., 
1991). 
            The appearance of Meadows’ review coincided with the publication (Newcombe 
and Ratcliff 1975) of a case of associative visual agnosia. The patient MS, in addition to 
difficulties in object recognition, was deficient in naming, matching or sorting coloured 
tokens and it is this subsidiary finding that was to become of central interest as a case of 
complete achromatopsia. MS, a 22 year old police cadet suffered idiopathic herpes 
encephalitis resulting in bilateral brain damage, described in detail elsewhere (Heywood 
et al., 1991). Damage in the right hemisphere was more extensive than the left. The 
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calcarine cortex was present in the left hemisphere but the mesial and lateral aspects of 
the occipital lobe of the right hemisphere were destroyed, accounting for a left 
hemianopia with macular sparing. In the left temporal lobe the damage included the 
temporal pole, the fourth temporal and hippocampal gyri and the area of the mesial 
occipitotemporal junction. The ventromedial location of the brain damage was 
consistent with other cases of achromatopsia. However, MS remains a particularly 
informative patient because of the severity of his colour impairment. 
            The Farnsworth-Munsell 100-Hue test, an effective means of testing 
perceptualcolour deficiency, requires patients to place a number of equiluminant 
coloured chips in chromatic order between two endpoints. The higher the number of 
misplacements, the larger the total errors score. In an extensive review of published 
cases, Bouvier and Engel (2006) reported a mean score of 582 achieved by 46 cases of 
achromatopsia. MS’ score of 1245, no better than that which results from random 
ordering, exceeds that of any published case. The incomplete nature of the colour 
disorder in the majority of other cases makes it difficult to reveal the contribution of 
spectral processes beyond assigning colour to surfaces.  For example, MS is quite 
unable to select the odd-one-out of three patches, i.e. two reds and an equiluminant 
green, even at the extremes of the colour gamut of a visual display. Yet a patch 
embedded in a background of an otherwise discriminable colour (e.g. red on green) can 
be readily discerned. That is, MS is able to see borders between two, for him, 
phenomenally indistinguishable colours. This surprising ability to detect chromatic 
contrast between two apparently perceptually identical surfaces would, of course, be 
impossible to demonstrate in observers where, albeit impoverished, colour differences 
between surfaces persist, as in casesof incomplete achromatopsia. 
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            It may be tempting to relate the preserved ability to segment the visual scene on 
the basis of unseen colour differences to the well-known role of the colour-opponent P- 
and K- channels and the broad-band M-channel of primate vision. The division of 
labour between the colour-opponent channels and broadband channel is such that the 
former have been assigned a role in colour and fine detail vision whereas the latter, 
responding well to low contrast and to rapid spatial and temporal fluctuations, has been 
assigned a role in motion (and low-contrast) vision (Shapley & Hawken, 2011; Lee, 
2015). Perhaps, then, MS has lost the colour opponent pathways and is reliant on a 
surviving M-channel. It is known that cells in the broadband channel can signal 
chromatic contour without coding information about the colours of which the contours 
are composed (Saito et al., 1989). This property may mediate MS’ preserved ability to 
detect equiluminant contour. However, there is persuasive evidence that this is not the 
case and that MS retains colour opponent channels. He continues to detect chromatic 
borders even when confronted with a chromatic visual display into which rapid and 
spurious spatial and temporal luminance fluctuations are introduced. The robust 
response by the M-channel to such rapid luminance variation renders it unable to signal 
wavelength variation and provides strong evidence for the integrity of colour-opponent 
pathways in patient MS (Heywood et al, 1994). This has been confirmed by 
measurements of spectral sensitivity (Heywood et al, 1991). M.S. does not show the 
single peak of sensitivity to wavelengths of  ~550nm, characteristic of the sensitivity of 
the broad-band M-channel. Instead, his sensitivity peaks at three different wavelengths, 
indicative of colour-opponent mechanisms of the P-channel (Sperling & Harwerth, 
1971). Moreover, a consequence of colour-opponency, as seen in the profile of spectral 
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sensitivity, is that a patch of light created by a mixture of red and green light appears 
yellow but also appears conspicuously dimmer than would be expected on the basis of 
simple brightness additivity (Guth, 1965). While unable to discern the colours, MS 
experiences a similar reduction in perceived brightness of the colour mixture. 
             While the contribution of chromatic signals to motion processes is uncertain, 
neuroimaging suggests that cortical area MT, a region specialized for visual motion, is 
activated by chromatic motion (Ffytche, Skidmore, & Zeki, 1995). Cells in area MT of 
the macaque monkey respond to equiluminant gratings where, from moment to moment, 
the phase of the grating is stepped by 90o (Dobkins & Albright, 1994). Each step results 
in the replacement of one border (e.g. red/green) with another of opposite sign (e.g. 
green/red). The direction of motion should thus be ambiguous to a cell or an observer 
blind to the sign of the colour. Nevertheless, M.S. effortlessly reported the 'correct' 
direction of apparent movement, but was quite unable to discriminate the constituent 
colours of the grating (Heywood et al., 1994). While the capacity to use wavelength 
variation to signal colour is abolished, spectral differences continue to signal not only 
visual form but direction of visual motion. 
In summary, the loss of colour vision in achromatopsia can leave other 
wavelength-based, spectral processes intact. These surviving abilities to detect form or 
motion direction from wavelength variation are not mediated by what remains of a 
damaged 'colour centre' - a possibility in cases of incomplete achromatopsia - but by 
independent spectral processes which use wavelength differences to derive other visual 
attributes. While each of these remaining processes has a consciouscorrelate, i.e. the 
contours are visible to MS and he experiences visual motion, it is far from certain how 
the visual world appears to such an achromatopsic observer. 
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Cases of achromatopsia are frequently reported where patients are said to complain that 
their visual world is drained of colour or consists of 'dirty' shades of grey. However, MS 
shows a noticeable reluctance to provide a description of his phenomenal experience. 
When asked about the properties of surfaces with which he is confronted, he will never 
spontaneously use colour terms, including achromatic terms such as ‘black’, ‘white’ or 
‘grey’. Moreover, he is evidently mystified when asked to describe the colour or 
property of a single surface, but more willing to compare two surfaces and assign 
comparative terms such as ‘brighter’ or ‘darker’. Perhaps, a commentary on the 
appearance of surfaces is only possible in cases with incomplete achromatopsia. 
Perhaps, in cases of complete achromatopsia it is impossible to provide a commentary 
on the absence of a perceptual property of a surface when the cortex that normally is 
responsible for providing the percept is missing. In the same manner, it is not 
uncommon for a substantial field loss, as a consequence of damage to striate cortex, to 
go unreported. In support of this, von Arx et al. (2010) have reported a longitudinal 
study of a patient with cerebral achromatopsia from stroke, who was initially entirely 
unaware of his deficit. In the course of recovery, the patient’s subjective complaints 
about his condition paradoxically increased as colour vision returned. Awareness of the 
deficit, and hence the capacity to describe the appearance ofsurfaces, was presumably 
coupled with the recovery of the cortical machinery responsible for colour perception. 
The authors suggest that a common neural substrate underlies both visual processing 
and conscious perception. 
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In accordance with this, the loss of the perceptual experience of hue has been 
interpreted by some as a failure of colour constancy, namely those mechanisms essential 
for the 'synthesis' or 'construction' of colour (Zeki, 1990a; Bartels & Zeki, 2000). 
Surfaces are composed of different materials that reflect light of different wavelengths 
with different efficiencies. It is the proportion of light of different wavelengths that 
reaches the eye that signals the properties of that material. However, there can be 
considerable variation in the light illuminating the world, for example over the course of 
the day, or as a result of shadows. The wavelength composition of the reflected light 
from a surface therefore depends on the spectral power distribution of the illuminant 
and the spectral reflectance function of a surface. If the perceived colour were simply 
determined by the wavelength composition of light reflected from a surface, then, as the 
nature of the illuminant changes, we would live in a world of shifting colours. Our 
perception of an object as having an invariant colour despite changes in its illuminant 
requires that we successfully 'discount the illuminant' (Helmholtz, 1911). This is called 
colour constancy and the visual system appears adapted to achieving it (albeit not 
perfectly). Many cues may be used heuristically to estimate illumination within a scene, 
for example in the manner described by the Retinex colour-constancy algorithm 
developed by Edwin Land (Land & McCann, 1971). 
If achromatopsia is a failure of constancy mechanisms, then it certainly should 
not be assumed that the visual experience of an achromatopsic observer is of a world 
stripped of colour, in the same manner that a normal observer may experience a 
monochrome display. Indeed, the cortical mechanisms required to assign a colour to a 
surface on the basis of its reflectance properties are no different for the assignation of 
greys than for any other hue. While a failure of colour constancy remains a plausible 
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explanation of achromatopsia, there are reports of defective colour constancy without 
any accompanying impairment in colour matching (Clarke et al., 1998) or hue 
discrimination (Rüttiger et al., 1999). Such dissociations are not consistent with the 
view that deficient hue discrimination is a consequence of a failure of colour constancy. 
Moreover, a recent report (Norman et al., 2015) suggests that, in normal observers, 
colour constancy mechanisms operate in the absence of awareness and are not, by 
themselves, sufficient to give rise to phenomenal colour experience. 
The study of a case of complete cerebral achromatopsia has uncovered some 
surprising dissociations in the visual processing of wavelength variation. Apart from 
deriving the colours that make up our visual experience, such processes contribute to 
signalling other perceptual attributes such as form and motion. The loss of phenomenal 
colour experience has also repeatedly been shown to be quite distinct from other 
disorders of colour such as disorders of colour naming (Oxbury et al., 1969), colour 
agnosia (Beauvois & Saillant, 1985), and deficits of colour imagery and memory 
(Kinsbourne & Warrington, 1967; Luzzatti & Davidoff, 1994). Cerebral achromatopsia, 
and its partner, cerebral akinetopsia, to which we now turn, serve as striking examples 
of selective visual disorders. 
The case of cerebral akinetopsia 
The functions of motion vision are ubiquitous; apart from conveying information 
about the trajectories of objects in the world, motion vision can aid, for example, 
postural and locomotor control, image segmentation, and the perception of depth and 
distance. 
In classical psychophysics, visual movement perception was long understood in 
physical terms, i.e. as a derivate of a calculation based on the distance a stimulus has 
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passed in a given time period, which allows the judgment of speed, and the 
consideration of successive stimulus positions, which allows the judgment of direction 
of movement. In 1931, Brown evaluated the state of scientific knowledge on movement 
vision and concluded that there is a “lack of correlation between the velocity of the 
stimulating movement and the phenomenal velocity. … Velocity is perceived directly” 
(p. 199; 231). Many years later, Gibson (1954) came to the same conclusion. “Visual 
motion is a ‘sensory’ variable of experience. It has a kind of intensity (speed) and a kind 
of quality (direction). … But more than any sensory impression, it fails to correspond to 
the physical stimulus presumed for it. … It cannot be assumed, that a movement is the 
same thing in the object, the retina, the brain, and consciousness” (pp. 310-311). 
While visual motion perception has long been studied with the tools of 
psychophysics, by the 1960s this was supplemented with     a wealth of physiological 
findings. For example, Carlson (1962) and Sekuler and Ganz (1963) used selective 
adaptation, a psychophysical technique assessing the effects of the repeated presentation 
of one stimulus on a  subsequently presented stimulus, to dissociate perception of the  
direction and speed of moving visual stimuli, and found evidence for a dissociation. 
Such findings were interpreted in the context of current knowledge of primate visual 
cortical neurophysiology. The discovery of striate cortical cells that explicitly represent 
the direction of motion of a moving retinal image was followed by a report (Zeki, 
1974b)  of an apparent specialisation for visual motion analysis in an extrastriate 
cortical area in the posterior bank of the temporal sulcus in the rhesus monkey (area 
V5). It became clear that a neurological case with selective loss of movement vision 
after brain injury would provide a persuasive argument for movement vision as a 
discrete and localizable visual capability. 
12 
 
In 1911, Pötzl and Redlich had published a report on a patient who presented 
with a difficulty in seeing visual stimuli in motion, while colour and form vision were 
intact. Unfortunately, this patient suffered a severe concentric visual field restriction. 
Therefore, the difficulty with movement vision was probably selective, but not specific, 
because the severe visual field restriction may have impaired the patient’s ability to 
visually grasp the moving stimulus. Riddoch (1917) published several cases who 
showed preserved vision of moving stimuli in homonymous field regions, in which 
patients were unable to see form or colour. This observation has often been used as a 
complementary argument for the existence of a brain mechanisms particularly engaged 
in the analysis of visual movement. However, because a moving visual stimulus has a 
higher salience, it can be more readily detected even in amblyopic regions of the visual 
field. It was not until 1983, that the first report on a patient, LM, with selective and 
specific loss of movement vision appeared (Zihl et al., 1991). The term cerebral 
akinetopsia was coined by Zeki (1991) to describe this condition. 
LM was a 43-year-old woman who, following bilateral posterior brain injury, 
had nearly completely lost the ability to see visual stimuli in motion. She was articulate 
in her description of her difficulties, for example, that everything appeared “restless”, 
walking people and dogs “jumped forth and back”, without a clear direction, cars 
“appeared and disappeared, with nothing in between”, fluids (milk, water, coffee, tea) 
appeared like “frozen liquids”. A very detailed analysis revealed cognitive slowing as 
an unspecific symptom (which is a common functional consequence of brain injury; 
Bashore & Ridderinkhof, 2002), but normal visual fields, visual acuity, contrast 
sensitivity, colour and form vision, stereopsis, object and face perception and 
recognition, and reading. Spatial and temporal resolution, as well as visual localization, 
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were not impaired. LM could discriminate between moving and non-moving stimuli, 
and could indicate the direction of movement, provided single stimuli were used, and 
speed did not exceed ~ 6 deg/s. Her cognitive abilities (attention, memory, executive 
function) were not impaired. Thus, LM showed a selective visual disorder, because all 
other visual functions and capabilities were intact. Furthermore, her visual disorder was 
also specific, because other visual or non-visual deficits could not explain it. As 
expected, visual movement blindness secondarily impairedvisually guided eye- and 
hand-movements when the stimulus was moving (e.g., pursuit eye-movements or 
catching a moving object). Interestingly, her akinetopsia also affected perception of 
facial expressions and of lip reading, indicating that both capabilities are reliant on 
perception of visual motion. The observations on LM, together with reports of other 
authors and of experimental work in primates (for a comprehensive review, see Zihl & 
Heywood, 2015) strongly support the idea that movement vision is a genuine visual 
perceptual capability, which has its own representation in extrastriate visual cortex. 
Thus, LM’s case contributed significantly to the understanding of the functional 
organisation of the visual brain in general, and of the cortical representation of 
movement vision in particular. 
The case of visual agnosia 
The quest for the cortical seat of vision and its topographic representation of the 
retina had preoccupied neurologists and physiologists during the close of the 19thC. The 
correspondence of injury to the afferent, postchiasmatic visual system and resulting 
homonymous visual field defects was used as basis for the understanding of the 
topographic representation of the visual field. In pursuit of this goal the German 
physiologist Hermann Munk (1881) had produced various cortical lesions in dogs and 
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distinguished between Rindenblindheit (cortical blindness) and Seelenblindheit (psychic 
blindness). The complete loss of vision in the former was in contrast to the latter, where 
dogs were unable to remember the meaning of objects they had encountered, yet 
retained the visual capacity to navigate and avoid obstacles. Influenced by Munk and 
others (Ferrier 1876), clinical visual neuroscience turned its attention to so-called higher 
visual abilities including colour vision, visual space perception and, in particular, 
identification and recognition of visual stimuli. The first detailed report of the latter 
which, following Munk, was described as a case of ‘psychic blindness’, was published 
by Wilbrand in 1887 (for an English translation, see Solms, Kaplan-Solms, & Brown, 
1996). The more recent term ‘visual agnosia’, meaning ‘without knowledge’, was 
coined by Freud in 1891 to describe the condition of visual sensation without 
recognition. The patient Mrs. G, a 63-year-old female, had suffered a sudden brain 
injury (presumably bilateral occipital stroke), with transient loss of consciousness and 
loss of vision. Vision recovered, but was restricted to the central visual field. In 
addition, the patient was aware of her persisting difficulties with the recognition of 
familiar people and with her topographical memory. Wilbrand examined Mrs. G in 
detail four years after her brain injury. She showed an incomplete left-sided 
homonymous hemianopia and a right-sided lower quadranopia in the right hemifield. 
Visual acuity, colour, form vision and reading were normal. The most striking visual 
disorder was a total loss of recognition of familiar objects and faces, including her own 
face when looking in a mirror; the physiognomy of familiar faces looked indistinct. 
Furthermore, she could never remember new faces. In contrast, she could “recall to 
mind the sound of a voice or the dialect of my visitors and could easily recognise them 
thereafter” (Solms, Kaplan-Solms, & Brown, 1996, p. 95). Interestingly, she was also 
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able to evoke correct visual impressions of everyday objects from memory when she 
could touch them. In summary, this case shows that visual recognition of objects and 
faces was severely impaired despite preserved visual acuity, sufficient (although 
restricted) visual fields and preserved colour and form vision. Furthermore, visual 
imagination, either elicited by auditory (voices) or tactile (touching of objects) stimuli, 
was prompt and correct.  Thus, detailed analysis with an emphasis on systematic 
observation and investigation led Wilbrand to the correct conclusion. Visual agnosia in 
this patient occurred as a selective visual disorder, which is not explained by impaired 
elementary visual sensory abilities that are necessary, but not sufficient, prerequisites 
for visual recognition. Furthermore, the preservation of visual object and face imagery 
can dissociate from visual recognition, i.e. they are not lost because of visual agnosia, or 
cause visual agnosia when lost (for a detailed discussion, see Solms, Kaplan-Solms, & 
Brown, 1996). 
Three years after Wilbrand’s seminal case, Lissauer (1890) published the first 
comprehensive account of visual agnosia, including the single case, Mr. L. Lissauer’s 
approach differed in two principal aspects from that of Wilbrand (1887). He was the 
first to make use of an a priori definition of visual agnosia as a genuine disorder of 
visual recognition, which cannot be explained by visual-sensory, cognitive, or aphasic 
deficits. In addition, he deduced his methodological approach and assessment from a 
theoretical framework, where visual recognition is understood as an integrative process 
(‘synthesis’) at the perceptual level. Lissauer differentiated between visual agnosia at 
the perceptual and the semantic level; the first he named apperceptive agnosia and the 
second, associative agnosia. In addition, Lissauer did not rely only on the patient’s 
subjective reports concerning his visual difficulties, but used a simple, experimental 
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approach. In the first experimental condition, he presented various everyday objects, 
which the patient should recognize visually. In a second condition, his patient had 
access to tactile (form, material) or acoustic information (sound) of the same object. The 
main outcome was that his 80-year-old male patient could recognize individual visual 
object features (e.g., size, form, details), but was unable to grasp objects as a whole. For 
Lissauer’s definition, the sparing of the visual sensory prerequisites (‘sensations’), 
which are essentialfor visual perception (=recognition), was a crucial issue. Mr. L 
showed a complete right-sided homonymous hemianopia; visual acuity was about 0.6, 
colour matching was correct, visual localization, line bisection and size and distance 
perception were normal; stereoscopic vision was moderately reduced. Copying of 
simple objects was not impaired, which also indicated that basic visual abilities were 
intact. From these observations,  Lissauer concluded that the integration of object parts 
or features was the chief underlying difficulty, i.e. the visual ‘synthesis’ of visual 
sensations, was the main underlying impairment. Interestingly, the patient could 
correctly name objects based on non-visual information and from verbal description, 
indicating that the associative (semantic) system was intact. The observation that the 
patient could select the correct colour or object according to a verbally given name was 
consistent with this. In contrast to Wilbrand’s patient, topographical orientation and 
recognition of familiar (famous) faces were normal in Lissauer’s patient. Lissauer went 
well beyond Wilbrand’s theoretical framework by developing a two stage-model of 
visual identification, the first entailing visual perception and the second, visual 
recognition. Moreover, he defined unequivocal exclusion criteria to rule out nonspecific 
(so-called secondary) disorders of visual recognition. Despite the proposal that visual 
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recognition is a two-stage process, Lissauer did not expect ‘pure’ forms of apperceptive 
or associative agnosia. Instead, he emphasized their intimate interplay. 
 Riddoch and Humphreys (1987) reported a similar case of visual agnosia, 
patient HJA, who also showed this piecemeal kind of object processing and description, 
but with intact visual form imagery. Because this type of visual processing was not 
limited to objects and faces but also occurred in a parallel search condition, indicating 
that the patient was unable to group visual stimuli, these authors preferred the term 
‘integrative agnosia’ to denote the special character of this type of visual agnosia. 
Failures of ‘synthesis’ or ‘integration’ both denote difficulties in spatial and/or feature-
based visual grouping operations to enable the observer to establish a mental gestalt of 
single stimuli or parts of a more complex visual stimulus. Thus, the very detailed single 
case study of Riddoch and Humphreys (1987), with much more sophisticated methods 
of visual analysis, are consistent with both Lissauer’s findings, based on comparatively 
simple methods of assessment and his concept of visual agnosia (for a detailed report 
and discussion, see Humphreys, 1999). 
It is essential, but not straightforward, to distinguish between cases of genuine 
agnosia and those where difficulties in visual identification result from impaired ‘lower’ 
visual capacities such as visual acuity, contrast or form vision. This is best exemplified 
by the case of Goldstein and Gelb (1918), who reported a 24-year old male patient who 
suffered a traumatic brain injury caused by shrapnel. Binocular visual fields were 
restricted to about 30 degrees horizontally in each hemifield; binocular visual acuity 
was 0.50, but showed marked fluctuations (possibly because of pathological fatigue). 
Colour vision and depth perception were intact; movement vision was impaired. He 
could recognise familiar objects and reported details of other complex visual stimuli, 
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but failed completely to copy figures, although he could draw simple forms from 
memory. He could not read, but could write. However, by using kinaesthetic 
information (e.g. by tracing outlines with a finger), he could identify forms, objects and 
letters. Visual identification of forms and letters improved when the patient used head 
movements as a compensatory strategy. Interestingly, he could ‘see’ illusory figures, for 
example the Müller-Lyer illusion. Goldstein and Gelb (1918) interpreted their 
observations in the framework of Gestalt Psychology. They assumed that their patient 
had lost the perception of Gestalten, sparing the perception of colours, size and location, 
but impairing the integration of object properties leading to a Gestalt. In a 
comprehensive theoretical paper, Poppelreuter (1923) discussed the details of this study 
and, based on the outcome of experiments with normal subjects, demonstrated that 
similar difficulties can be ‘simulated’ by restricting the field of visual processing and 
thereby limiting ‘simultaneous’ (i.e. parallel) processing of multiple visual stimuli 
arrays. He concluded that the patient of Goldstein and Gelb (1918) did not demonstrate 
genuine visual agnosia, but a kind of ‘pseudoagnosia’ as a result of impaired visual 
functions that serve as crucial prerequisites for visual recognition. This single case study 
provoked a spirited discussion, lasting some 40 years, without reaching a satisfactory 
conclusion (see Grüsser and Landis, 2000). There may well be alternative explanations 
for the pattern of impairments. Some characteristics of the case, for example the 
frequent use of head movements to overcome a limited overview or the inconsistency of 
responses to the same or similar visual stimulus configurations, may point toward either 
a more severe visual field defect or a restriction of the field of attention (so-called Balint 
syndrome, see below). In addition, visual field examination was performed with light 
stimuli only; thus, it is not clear whether form and colour vision were preserved in the 
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spared field regions. It has been known since the work of Wilbrand and Saenger (1892), 
Poppelreuter (1917/1990) and Riddoch (1917)  that visual field regions may show a loss 
of colour and form vision, while light vision is preserved or only depressed (see also 
Zihl, 2011). Thus, the patient of Goldstein and Gelb (1918) may have suffered loss of 
colour and form vision in the perifoveal field regions, while light vision was preserved 
more peripherally. In addition, the observed pathological fluctuations in visual acuity 
and visual performance after brain injury, with and without defective accommodation, 
have been reported by others (Poppelreuter, 1917/1990; Zihl & Schmid, 1989).   These 
secondary factors could explain difficulties with processing complex, larger visual 
stimuli. The difficulty in attributing impaired identification and recognition to visual 
agnosia, without due consideration of the possibility that low-level sensory disturbances 
are a cause, is illustrated by a recent study. Serino et al. (2014) have shown, in a 
detailed single case study, that a homonymous central scotoma, combined with a severe 
deficit in line orientation processing, can impair visual recognition to an extent that 
corresponds well to the neuropsychological entity of visual agnosia. 
 The single cases reported by Wilbrand (1887) and Lissauer (1890) had shown 
that agnosia might comprise all or only some visual categories (objects, faces, letters, 
surroundings). The early idea of the functional specialization of the visual brain 
considered mainly “lower” visual capabilities, e.g. colour, form and movement vision. 
Wilbrand and Lissauer went beyond and assumed, based on their single cases, that 
visual perception and visual recognition can dissociate, but did not address a further 
fractionation within visual recognition. The first authors to report a case of particularly 
selective agnosia, and suggest a cerebral specialization for face processing, were Hoff 
and Pötzl in 1937. In the acute phase, their patient showed a global form of visual 
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agnosia, i.e. recognition in all categories was affected. However, the patient recovered 
fully from agnosia for letter (pure alexia), and partly from object agnosia, but showed 
no recovery for his agnosia for familiar faces, including his own face. It was the 
German ophthalmologist Bodamer who pursued the idea of faces being a particular 
visual category. His argument for this was based on research on the presence of face 
perception in babies (Bühler, 1934) showing its fundamental biological relevance. In 
1947, Bodamer reported on two patients with severe persistent failures in recognizing 
familiar faces, and coined the term ‘Prosop-Agnosie’ (prosopagnosia) (from Greek 
‘prosopos’ and ‘agnosia’ = ‘agnosia for faces’). Bodamer’s patients exhibited various 
visual impairments, including reduced visual acuity, homonymous uni- or bilateral 
visual field defects with impaired overview, cerebral dys- or achromatopsia, and 
impaired visual recognition of objects. However, the most severe visual disorder 
affected the recognition of familiar faces. Both patients used a feature-by-feature 
analysis, and appeared to have difficulties with integrating the single features into a 
whole face, in a manner similar to Lissauer’s patient. The caveats of ruling out 
elementary sensory disturbance as a causal factor also apply to these cases and 
prosopagnosia was not selective, i.e. not the only visual category affected. Nevertheless, 
it remains to Bodamer’s credit that he stressed that visual face perception is a special 
visual capability. De Renzi (1986) reported several single cases with rather ‘pure’ 
prosopagnosia, but in no case did prosopagnosia appear highly selective, probably 
because the brain injuries encroached on cortex beyond those subserving the brain 
mechanism in question. It is now apparent that visual face perception has its own 
representation in the visual brain, which has been shown in numerous brain mapping 
studies (e.g., Parvizi et al.,  2012). 
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As counterparts to Lissauer’s distinction, prosopagnosia can also occur in an 
apperceptive and associative (amnesic) form (De Renzi et al., 1991). A further 
dissociation, particular to the role that faces play in social communication, was evident 
in Bodamer’s cases who complained of being unable to understand facial expressions. 
Such cases of dissociation of face identification and recognition of facial expressions 
have repeatedly arisen (Calder & Young, 2005), indicating that independent processing 
mechanisms underlie the two visual capacities. It is important to note, however, that 
patients with prosopagnosia have no difficulties in saying that a face is a face, and to 
discriminate faces, indicating that this level of processing is intact. 
Bodamer’s theoretical, developmental perspective on the particular nature of 
visual face recognition is also supported by reports of single cases with developmental, 
congenital prosopagnosia. The condition is characterized by a child’s inability to learn 
to recognise faces, while recognition performance for other visual categories is less 
affected, although not normal (e.g., Ariel & Sadeh, 1996; Barton et al., 2003). 
Identification of facial expressions is more often preserved in developmental compared 
with acquired prosopagnosia (Humphreys et al., 2007). 
 
The case of visual impairment because of loss of spatial attention 
 
Severe restriction of the overview is typically observed in patients with bilateral 
homonymous hemianopia, also called tunnel vision, because the visual field is limited 
to a few degrees of visual angle, and visual scanning is usually severely impaired (Zihl, 
2011). Patients may behave indistinguishably from people suffering complete blindness 
and may chiefly be reliant on acoustic and tactile information to guide their behaviour. 
There exists, however, a condition, where patients do not exhibit bilateral loss of the 
visual field, yet behave as if they have lost their sight. Balint (1909) stressed the 
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importance of (spatial) attention for the ability to process stimuli appearing within the 
visual field. His patient, an older male (age not reported) had suffered a bilateral stroke. 
Visual acuity was normal, but during acuity testing the patient showed a strange 
phenomenon. He read only the letters on the right end of the line, and was completely 
unaware that he omitted all the other items. After instruction to look to the left, he 
searched for other letters and read them correctly, but it took him much effort and time 
to find the items. He commented that he reads the letter he can see when he is looking at 
the acuity chart, then moves on to the next line, and reads the new letter, etc. Visual 
perimetry did not reveal any visual field defect, either for light or for colour and form 
stimuli. Themain problem was that the patient could only see a visual stimulus when it 
(a form, figure, picture, or word) appeared in his line of sight. However, even in this 
condition he seemed to have a rather small field of visual processing, because he could 
only see a stimulus if it did not exceed a particular size, and if it was presented as a 
single stimulus. Balint showed his patient pairs of stimuli. Apart from a difficulty in 
seeing stimuli to the left or right of his line of sight - in which case the patient found it 
more difficult to detect stimuli on the left side - he could perceive only one stimulus at a 
time in the spared field of vision. The size of this field was somewhat flexible and 
depended on the size of the stimulus. If a smaller and a larger stimulus were presented 
together, for example a small circle in the centre of a larger triangle, the patient reported 
only the circle. If the circle was removed, the patient reported the triangle. Thus, the 
patient could somehow adjust his field of attention to the size of the stimulus within 
given limits. If asked to shift his gaze to the left or right from the fixation position, the 
patient could do so; he never shifted his gaze spontaneously to get a more complete 
overview. The patient also had great difficulty with visual localization; for example, he 
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was unable to light a cigar on the very end, but lighted it always somewhere in the 
middle. The restriction of his field of attention, the lack of spontaneous visual 
exploration, and the impaired visual localization understandably represented a severe 
visual handicap for the patient’s activities of daily living. He stayed in the hospital until 
he died three years later. 
Because of the loss of spontaneous (i.e. intentional) gaze shifts, Balint coined the 
term “psychic paralysis of gaze” (‘Seelenlähmung desSchauens’) to denote this special 
condition of restricted gaze, which is not observed in cases with tunnel vision. The main 
conclusion Balint drew from his observations was that an intact visual field by itself 
was not sufficient for processing visual stimuli outside the line of sight, but that 
attention was required too. The field of attention can be adjusted in a variable manner, 
depending on the region of visual interest for stimulus analysis (global or local analysis) 
and the intention of the observer. The loss of this flexible adaptation of the size of the 
field of attention causes a pathological focusing of attention to just a small region of the 
visual environment (scene) or object (a spotlight); stimuli or stimulus information 
outside this region are no longer perceived. Because gaze shifts are also restricted to this 
region, the patient is unable to compensate for the restricted field of attention, as is 
possible in the case of tunnel vision. A further feature of Balint’s patient was a 
persistent deviation of his gaze to the right, and greater difficulty with shifting his gaze 
spontaneously to the left (although he could do so after instruction). This could be 
explained by the larger extent of the right-sided posterior parietal injury. For the 
anatomical interpretation of the symptoms of his patient, Balint did not only refer to the 
affected cortical areas in the parietal lobes. He also considered the association fibres that 
connect the occipital lobe with the temporal and parietal lobes, and explained the 
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absence of spontaneous oculomotor activities and the impaired visual guidance of hand 
movements by the interruption of these fibre pathways. Geschwind (1965) outlined the 
importance of fibre connections for the organization of sensorimotor relationships in 
more detail in his concept of “disconnection syndromes”. Holmes (1918) added further 
insight to the syndrome described by Balint, in particular concerning eye-movements 
and visual space perception. Holmes’ patients also showed difficulties with shifting 
their gaze on command, had impaired pursuit eye-movements, and exhibited deficits in 
visual depth perception. As a tribute to both neuroscientists, the syndrome is called 
“Balint-Holmes syndrome” in the international literature, because the research of both 
significantly contributed to the crucial interaction between visual perception and spatial 
attention and to higher-order mechanisms involved in visually-guided oculomotor and 
motor behaviour (De Renzi, 1996). Again, it was the methodological approach of 
analysing in detail affected and spared functions in the framework of association and 
dissociation of visual-perceptual, visual-cognitive, and oculomotor functions on the 
bases of single case studies, which enabled Balint and Holmes to solve a complex 
scientific and clinical riddle. 
Comments and Conclusions 
As exemplified by the cases reported in this paper, single cases have always 
played a prominent role in visual neuroscience. Single case analyses have helped to 
understand the functional organization of the visual brain in humans, which comprises 
the neuropsychological and neurobiological levels, i.e. visual perception and underlying 
brain mechanisms (Zeki & Bartels, 1998). The main reason is the fact that some visual 
disorders are rare and can consequently only be studied in single cases. For example, 
cerebral achromatopsia has been reported in many cases, albeit total achromatopsia is 
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rare (for a comprehensive review, see Zeki, 1990), but cerebral akinetopsia was only 
reported in three cases (there exist, however, many reports of impaired colour vision 
and movement vision in one hemifield; for a synopsis see Zihl, 2013, and Zihl & 
Heywood, 2015). Visual agnosia has been reported by Hecaen & Angelergues (1963) in 
seven (1.7%) out of 415 patients with posterior brain injury, and prosopagnosia in 22 
(5.7%) out of 382 patients (Hecaen & Angelergues, 1962).  Gloning, Gloning & Hoff 
reported visual agnosia in three (1.2%), prosopagnosia in one (0.4%), and Balint-
Holmes syndrome in seven (2.9%) out of 241 patients. The very rarity of these visual 
disorders are a challenge not only for clinicians, because they have to detect the 
diagnostic symptoms, but also for the scientists, because only the detailed examination 
of visual and non-visual functions and capabilities allows a valid and conclusive 
analysis in terms of selectivity of the visual disorder in question. In addition, the 
association of visual symptoms is the rule, and therefore the proof for specificity is 
crucial, but very demanding and time consuming. Furthermore, the decision on whether 
a particular visual function/capability is a crucial prerequisite for colour or movement 
vision or for visual recognition, may be more or less arbitrary, because it depends on the 
model of visual perception on which the analysis of vision and the interpretation of the 
observations are based. In particular, the literature on visual agnosia is characterized by 
the polarization of theoretical frameworks, with authorities who have accepted and 
defended the existence of visual agnosia as a genuine visual disorder, while other 
authorities have questioned or even denied its existence (for a detailed discussion see 
Hecaen & Albert, 1978, and Grüsser & Landis, 1991). However, if one can 
unequivocally demonstrate that a particular visual capability can be impaired or lost 
selectively, and if the specificity of the disorder has been proven, then one single case is 
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sufficient to conclude that the visual capability in question is genuine and has its own 
representation in the visual brain. Conventional, standardized neuropsychological 
assessment is usually not sufficient to proof selectivity and specificity of a visual 
disorder, but experimental procedures are required, which quite often have to be 
developed for a valid single case analysis. This methodological challenge is, however, a 
hallmark of (neuro-)psychological science, and should remain so. Admittedly, earlier 
neuroscientists used simple methods, when compared with the technologies we have 
available today, but were nevertheless successful, as the enduring nature of their results 
and concepts is testimony. It should, however, be noted, that unequivocal demonstration 
of “dissociation of functions” in vision still relies crucially on the assessment of visual 
perception at the behavioural level. Recordings of brain activities, e.g. with fMRI, 
represent, of course, an interesting and important correlate, but cannot substitute for 
neuropsychological assessment of impaired and spared visual capabilities. 
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